Abstract. We present two efficient and simple fault attacks on the shrinking generator. In a first case if the attacker can stop control generator for some small number of steps and observe the output, then with high probability he can deduce the full control sequence, and so the other input bitstream. The second method assumes that the attacker can disturb the control sequence (in an unpredictable and random way) and observe many samples of such experiments. Then he can reconstruct a certain sequence that agrees with the input sequence of the generator on a large fraction of bits.
Introduction
This paper presents two new fault attacks (see [2] ) against the shrinking generator by Coppersmith et al. [3] , one of the major designs of efficient and secure pseudorandom generators. Our attacks are unique in many ways. To our best knowledge these are the first fault attacks on the shrinking generator; they also seem to be among the most efficient attacks. On top of that, it is generally agreed that the shrinking generator is composed out of LFSRs. However, we require no specific design of the generator (it can consist of any bit generators), apart from the possibilities regarding injecting faults of the assumed kind.
The paper is organized as follows: first we give a very brief overview of the shrinking generator. Then the Section 2 describes our first attack, based on synchronization fault assumption (the assumption is similar to those from [9] ). The Section 3 presents another attack, based on weaker assumptions. Finally the Section 4 briefly summarizes our results and states open problems.
The Shrinking Generator in a Pill The shrinking generator [3] is an attempt to create cryptographically strong pseudorandom bitstream generator out of relatively weak components. Many other solutions of this kind [7, 1, 4] were proven to be weak [13, 14] . The shrinking generator successfully faces the trial of time: the best known attacks against it are exponential in the LFSR's length [5, 8, [10] [11] [12] , or based on the assumption that the feedback is known [6] .
Amazingly, the construction of the shrinking generator is very simple. It consists of two LFSRs we shall call the base (or input) generator A and the control generator C; their output is denoted as a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . and c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , . . ., respectively. The output z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , . . . is composed of those and only those of a i for which c i = 1. Formally: z t = a i for i so that: t = i j=1 c j and c i = 1 .
An Attack with Synchronization Faults
Assumptions The attacker has a device implementing the shrinking generator and can use it freely. Assume that the base and control generators of the shrinking generator output bits according to the uniform distribution over {0, 1}. Also assume, that an attacker can disturb clocking of the device, namely we assume that he can stop the control sequence for a couple of steps, and observe the generator's output.
Basic Attack
Assume we have number of output sequences related to holding the control generator for 0 (i.e. with no fault), 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 steps. That is, we stop the control generator for a number of steps, the base generator moves on, so we have sequence of outputs
N related somehow to the base bitstreams a k+1 , a k+2 , a k+3 , . . . and the control bitstream c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , . . ..
Let us take a closer look at the data -see Table 1 . Our algorithm shall guess the length of blocks of zeroes that separate consecutive ones in the control bitstream. Note that if two ones are consecutive, the 2nd bit of the bitstream i is the same as the 1st bit of the bitstream i + 1, for each i. Analogously, if the ones are separated by a single zero, then the 2nd bit of bitstream i is the same as the 1st bit of bitstream i + 2, for each i. If so, it is easy to construct an algorithm that shall guess the number of zeroes separating the ones. It returns a set S l of all non-contradictory solutions -number of zeroes in the control stream between the two ones corresponding to output positions l and l + 1. However, we have to assume that the number of zeroes between two ones does not exceed a certain parameter maxzeroes. To obtain the whole control sequence we have to execute the algorithm for l = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and consider the set of all possible solutions Of course, it is impossible to recover the number of zeroes preceding the first one in the control sequence. Probability of a False Solution Lemma 1. Let n be the number output sequences analyzed and the correct number of zeroes between consecutive ones considered is l. Then the output set S contains l with probability 1, and contains an m, m = l, with probability 2 −(n−m−1) .
Proof. We are checking the hypothesis that there are m consecutive zeroes separating the two ones. If m = l, then all checked equations are identities. Assume that m = l. Let k be the number of pair checked: k = n − m − 1. So the following equations are checked:
. . .
Let us split those equations into separate "chains":
Let us consider a single chain
According to our assumption a i are random independent bits, so Pr{a i = 1} = 1 2 . Hence, the distribution of the vector (a i , a i+(l−m) , a i+2(l−m) , . . . , a i+p(l−m) ) is also uniform. Then the number of its' all possible states is 2 p+1 , while only two of them yield a vector of all-equal elements. Then the probability of fulfilling the equations building the chain equals 2 −p . Since all chains together contain k equations and the chains are disjoint, the events of fulfilling all chains' equations are independent, which concludes the proof.
Lemma 1 shows that the probability of a false result grows rapidly with the assumed length of the gap between the ones. That is why we assume that the control sequence does not contain a block of more than maxzeroes zeroes. Of course, if this assumption is false, the algorithm will fail.
Full Attack
Now we assume that we still have all Z k , but permuted according to an unknown, random permutation π. Such a situation can happen when we can stop the clocking for a couple of steps (no more than n − 1), but we cannot control the exact number of these steps. In such a scenario we would simply perform the experiments until we collect n different outputs, which would give us the complete set of outputs and no information about their ordering.
To perform an attack we first deduce the unknown permutation π, shuffle the outputs according to π −1 , and then perform the basic attack. Assume for a moment that the control sequence C is of the form 00 . . . 011 . . .. So if the Z k sequences are in the correct order, the following equations hold:
(see Table 1 ); conversely, for Z k and Z l (l = k + 1) we have z 
then
Let
denote all Hamiltonian paths in G. Then, for any given set of output sequences Z π(j) there exists i ∈ I so that v i j = π (j) holds for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. Of course, assumption (1) might be false, so it may be desirable to relax it: assume that among the first l control bits there are exactly k ones, and then there is continuous block of m ones. Then we could slightly modify the condition (2):
Of course, finding all Hamiltonian paths in a graph is a hard problem. However, in our restricted case it can be solved with a straightforward approach (since due to condition (3) the graph can be made almost arbitrarily sparse) and so we may use the following procedure:
-choose m ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . .};
-for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . construct the graph G, -find all possible Hamilton paths in G; if none found, then k was incorrect; each path in G corresponds to some π (·); -for each π sort outputs Z π(i) according to π −1 ; if π was guessed right, then for all i holds i = π −1 (π (i)), and so the output sequences are in the correct order; -for every sorted set of output sequences perform the basic attack.
Simulation Results
The algorithm described was implemented and run on a low-end home PC, with an AMD Athlon XP1800+ CPU and 512MB of RAM. Their results for 100 runs for each choice of parameters are summarized by Table 2 . Statistics of the attack; the columns have the following meaning: n -the number of output sequences, N -the length of output sequences, mz -the maxzeroes parameter, "c. p." -the number of column pairs checked during construction of G, "fails" -the number of fails (i.e. no solutions found), "avg. sol. count" -mean number of solutions (if found any), "avg. time" -mean calculations' time (in seconds), "avg. time 90%" -mean calculations' time after rejecting 10% of the worst cases.
An Attack with Random Faults
Now we assume that the attacker can disturb somehow the control sequence. It may be, for example, some additional cycles before the start of the system. Then he can observe only the output of the generator. The second assumption is that the procedure can be repeated with the same input sequence and with different faults on control sequence. Our goal is to obtain bits of the input sequence.
General Idea of the Attack
We assume a probabilistic model: we have an input sequence A = a 1 a 2 a 3 . . . and a set of control sequences
. . , C (n) are independent and truly random. For each i = 1, 2, . . . , n a sequence Z (i) is produced from A and C (i) by the shrinking generator. The attacker knows only Z (i) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and tries to recover the sequence A. Consider z (i) 1 , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If most of them are equal to, say, 0, then it is natural to assume that a 1 also equals zero. This is concluded from the fact that about half of z Linear Equations Let us count how many times one of a j is taken as one of z
and denote this number by d(k, j). Now we can write the following system of equations: Of course the attacker does not know the numbers d(k, j), but for large n he can approximate fractions d(k, j)/n with appropriate probabilities. By p k,j denote the probability that jth element of a sequence A is taken as kth element of output sequence. More formally:
where c 1 , c 2 , . . . is a random control sequence. So, d(k, j) can be approximated by n · p k,j . It is interesting now to investigate the distribution of random variable X k such that X k = j if and only if jth element of the sequence A is taken as kth element of the output sequence Z. By definition Pr {X k = j} = p k,j and it follows from (5) that
−j , for j ≥ k, and p k,j = 0, for j < k.
Theorem 1.
EX k = 2k and Var X k = 2k.
Proof. By the definition of X k and from (6) it is obvious that
In order to prove the equation EX k = 2k, we write
The last expression equals 2k due to equation (7). To prove that Var X k , we first calculate EX
Now we obtain Var X k as EX
Knowing EX k and Var X k , we can approximate the number of variables that with high probability will be sufficient to build a finite version of system (4). Clearly, the exact probability Pr(X k ≤ x) is expressed by the formula
The results obtained according to (8) are presented as Table 3 . Table 3 . Maximum number v of variable that will suffice to build an equation number k (with probability 0.99), according to formula (8) .
The formula (8) is rather complicated and that makes it hard to observe the overall tendency. So we proceed in order to find a compact formula which would approximate (8) and would enable us to conclude about properties of defined random variables.
Theorem 2. For random variables X k defined earlier, for all integers k ≥ 1 and for any real p ∈ (0, 1) we have
Lemma 2. For random variables X k defined above, and for all integers k ≥ 1, r ≥ 1 we have
Proof (of Lemma 2). If r = 1, then (10) is implied by Theorem 1. So assume that (10) is fulfilled for some r (and for all k) and we will prove it for r + 1 and for all k. We pick an arbitrary k and write
Proof (of Theorem 2).
Let m > 1 be some real number, we will approximate probability Pr(X k > 2km). Pick any integer r. Since for all positive valued random variables Y we have EY > w · Pr(Y > w), we can write
2 r k r m r .
Now due to Lemma 2 we have
2k m −x , x ∈ R + reaches its absolute minimum for x = k ln m, therefore we have
and for such m we have of course
Since there is a 1-to-1 correspondence between all p ∈ (0, 1) and all reals m > 1, the theorem follows.
Theorem 2 shows that for a fixed small p, the ratio between the number of needed variables and expected value of X k with high probability approaches 1 as k goes to ∞. We can also see that for large enough k, going from equation number k to equation number k + 1 we will need only about 2 more variables.
The Algorithm and the Simulations
Input: n sequences Z (1) , Z (2) , . . . , Z (n) , as described in 3.1, a number of equations w, a real number p ∈ (0, 1). The closer p to zero, the better solution.
Output: x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x wv -a candidate for the input sequence of the generator. Method:
1. For each k = 1, 2, . . . , w, calculate the number v k which guarantees inequality
Write the following approximation of the system (4): 
3. Let i := 1, v 0 := 0 and S prev := ∅. i numbers the equation considered in this step, S prev is the set of solutions found after dealing with equations 1, 2, . . . , i − 1. 4. Let S := ∅.
S is the set solutions considered after regarding equation i. 5. Take some s ∈ S prev . Let S prev := S prev \ {s}. Although the algorithm outputs v w bits of our guess of the input sequence, we have to stress that not all of the bits are of equal quality. The less is the number, the higher is the probability that the algorithm provides the right bit. Some experimental data is provided by One may ask how our assumption about independence of bits of control sequences stands in real situation. The Table 6 was calculated for control sequences generated by good quality LFSRs of length 32 with 4 taps. The fault are generated as one additional shift. One might expect much worse behavior, but the experiments show that the difference is insignificant. So far we can find most of few tens of bits, on average, of the input sequence. Finding sufficiently long sequence of bits is, in case of LFSR, equivalent to getting to know the whole sequences (it requires k bits in the case of known taps, and 2k bits in the case of unknown taps, where k is the number of bits of LFSR). If the attacker had some extreme power -like the possibility of obtaining, say, million different outputs for the same input sequence (and disturbed control sequences), then he could obtain more than 80% of 64 bits of the key. If one can have no more than 100 such sequences, then we expect to get about 60% of 64 bits. Observe (see the Table 5) , that bits at the beginning of the sequence are more "reliable" than others, so if one wants to perform exhaustive check, the changing of bits should begin from "the right end" of bits being guessed. This way we will minimize searching, and in an average case most of guessing will be not necessary and the attack on 64 bits becomes realistic.
Conclusions and Open Problems
Our attacks can be easily adapted against the weaker generators [7, 1, 4] related to the shrinking generator. In those cases the attacks are even easier.
Our attacks require injecting specific faults and restarting the device with partially the same internal state. While injecting such faults is potentially possible (especially for the second attack) it may require some design faults (so that potentially vulnerable parts of the device were placed on external layers). It shows at least that careful examining of a chip design might be necessary.
Potentially, such attacks can be adapted against the other algorithms like stream ciphers, hash functions, and even some symmetric block ciphers (for instance injecting synchronization faults into DES key schedule seems to be beneficial due to its' "shift-and-permute" design).
